Hospital Efficiency and Resource Allocation Under Diagnosis-Related Group Payment Systems: A Comparative Study
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22650141Keywords:
diagnosis-related groups, hospital payment reform, prospective payment system, hospital efficiency, DRG upcodingAbstract
Background: Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) payment systems have replaced retrospective cost-based and fee-for-service hospital
reimbursement across most high-income and a growing number of middle-income health systems since the introduction of the
United States Medicare prospective payment system in 1983, with the explicit policy goal of containing hospital expenditure growth
while preserving or improving efficiency and quality of inpatient care. Objective: This case study compares how DRG-based payment
has affected hospital efficiency, length of stay, resource allocation, cost containment, and care quality across a diverse set of
national systems, and examines the unintended consequences - particularly diagnostic upcoding ('DRG creep') - that have
accompanied these reforms. Methods: This is a narrative comparative case study, not a systematic review. Published, peer-reviewed
literature on DRG and DRG-like hospital payment systems in the United States, Australia, England, Germany, France, Hungary,
Japan, South Korea, China, Portugal, and Central and Eastern Europe was identified through targeted searches of PubMed and
journal databases and synthesized thematically around efficiency, length of stay, cost containment, upcoding, and quality
outcomes. Findings: Across settings, DRG implementation is consistently associated with reduced average length of stay and
increased hospital throughput, though effects on total expenditure and admission volume are more heterogeneous, with several
systems showing activity growth that partially offsets per-case savings. Evidence on quality of care is mixed but reassuring overall:
large-scale United States evaluations found no consistent deterioration in process or outcome quality despite 'quicker and sicker'
discharge concerns, and a multi-country meta-analysis of activity-based funding found no significant net effect on mortality or
readmission; however, several national comparisons document financially motivated diagnostic upcoding that inflates measured
case-mix severity without commensurate clinical change. Design features - the comprehensiveness of DRG coverage, the presence of
volume ceilings, and the strength of coding audit infrastructure - moderate both the efficiency gains and the magnitude of gaming
behavior observed across Australia, Germany, Hungary, Korea, France, Japan, Portugal, and transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe. Conclusions: DRG payment is a robust lever for improving measured hospital efficiency and shortening length of
stay, but the magnitude and unintended consequences of these effects depend heavily on system design and monitoring capacity;
policymakers should pair activity-based payment with coding audits, quality-linked adjustments, and volume safeguards to
capture efficiency gains without compromising care quality or inducing supply-side gaming.
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